In this note we prove the existence of minmax points for strategic form games where the sets of strategies are topological spaces and the payoff functions satisfy conditions weaker than continuity. The employed tools are the class of transfer weakly upper continuous functions and the class of weakly lower pseudocontinuous functions. An example shows that our result is of minimal character.
Introduction and preliminaries
A significant topic in the theory of strategic form games is that of repeated games: a repeated game consists in a strategic form game played several times, even infinite. In such a case, players could reach an outcome better than that obtained if the game is played only once. In fact, observing the auctions played at time t, the players have information in order to choose, again in a non-cooperative setting, auctions at the time t + 1 which lead to a better outcome: for instance, suppose that a game is played infinite times and there exists a strategy profile x more profitable than the Nash equilibrium which comes from the one shot game; moreover, assume that, if a player i deviates from x at the time t, the opponents can play in a way such that i gets the worst at any following time. Now, in view of the punishment from the opponents, player i is not willing to deviate from x. Hence, the existence of a punishment is crucial to force players to not deviate: we refer to [5] and references therein for a detailed exposition. The punishment for a player i is defined -see [5] -as a strategy profile of the opponents which realizes the minimum among the best outcomes that i can obtain. This idea is captured by the definition of minmax points.
. . , u n ) be an n-player strategic form game, where, for any player i, X i is the (nonempty) set of its strategies and u i is the real-valued payoff function defined on the set of strategy profiles X = n j=1 X j .
We denote a strategy profile x also by (x i , x −i ), where x i ∈ X i and x −i ∈ X −i = j =i X j . Assume that any player wishes to maximize his payoff. A strategy profile x i is said to be a minmax point for player i if the following holds:
) is said to be minmax value. Moreover, we say that G has minmax points if there exist minmax points for any player; in such a case, the vector ν = (ν 1 , . . . , ν n ) is said to be minmax value of G.
The minmax value satisfies also the following property (see [5] ): no equilibrium of the repeated game can give to player i a payoff less than his minmax value, which implies that deviation from an equilibrium path can be punished with the minmax value. Moreover, the minmax value plays a central role in the Folk Theorem: see [4, 5] . It is easy to see that minmax points could not exist. Hence, the aim of this note is to recognize a class of games, where the payoffs are non-necessarily continuous functions (we call this kind of games discontinuous), for which minmax points exist, following the wide investigation on discontinuous strategic form games: among the others, let us cite the seminal paper [3] and [9, 8, 10, 11, 7, 13] .
In the setting of games with continuous payoff functions, an existence result for minmax points has been given in [1] . 1 In order to provide sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of minmax points for discontinuous strategic form games, let us recall some classes of discontinuous real-valued functions: a function f : X → R is said to be -transfer weakly upper continuous if f (x) < f (x ) implies that there exists a neighborhood N of x and x such that f (z)
In a similar way, one can define transfer weakly lower continuous and weakly upper pseudocontinuous functions. The class of transfer weakly continuous functions has been introduced in [14] in order to give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of maximum and minimum points on compact topological space. The class of weakly pseudocontinuous function has been introduced first in [6] in order to give sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions to minsup and maxsup problems in a sequential setting. Then, the topological version recalled above has been introduced in [12] , where convergence properties of sequence of transfer weakly continuous functions and of sequence of weakly pseudocontinuous functions have been investigated.
Existence of minmax points
Now, we obtain the existence of minmax points in strategic games where the payoffs are less than continuous. The crucial tool is the following result: 
Proof. First, we consider the function φ defined over A 2 by φ( 
for each a 1 ∈ A 1 , which implies φ(a 2 ) lim inf z 2 →a 2 φ(z 2 ). Hence, the function φ is weakly lower pseudocontinuous at a 2 . Now, since any weakly lower pseudocontinuous function is also transfer weakly lower continuous, in light of [14, Theorem 1], there exists at least an a * 2 ∈ A 2 such that φ(a * 2 ) φ(a 2 ) for any a 2 ∈ A 2 . Moreover, there exists a
, and the proof is concluded. 2
We note that the assumption of weak lower pseudocontinuity on f (·, ·) cannot be relaxed by using the transfer weak lower continuity. In fact, consider the function f defined on [ Proof. For any player i, it is sufficient to apply Lemma 1 to the function f defined on
Let us note that games with payoff functions which satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1 arise, for example, when the players choose according to weakly continuous binary relations: see [2] for the definition and the motivations; in fact the utility functions of such binary relations are weakly pseudocontinuous. Besides, in the following example we have a game which satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1. 
